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We  extend  the  analysis  of  optimal  scale  in  pollution  permit  markets
by allowing  for  both  market  power  and  private  information.  We
characterize the  total  costs  (abatement  costs  and  damages)  under
market power  and  private  information  and  compare  them  to total
costs under  competition.  It is  possible  for both  market  power  and
private information  to lead  to  lower  total  costs  than  competition,
but generally  the  differences  between  the  three  market  structures
will be small.  We  also  conduct  an  optimal  scale  analysis  of  nitrogen
pollution from  waste  water  treatment  plants  (WWTP)  into  North
Carolina’s Neuse  River  System.  An  economic  model  of  damages
and abatement  costs  is  integrated  with  a hydro-ecological  model
of nitrogen  ﬂow  through  the  Neuse.  We  determine  the  optimal
number of  trading  zones  and  allocate  the  WWTP  into  these  zones.
Under the  most  likely  regulatory  scenario,  we  ﬁnd  cost  savings
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of  1.55  million  dollars  per  year  under  the  optimal  market  design
relative  to the  typical  303(d)  regulation  in  which  the  WWTP  are
not  allowed  to trade.
© 2013  Elsevier  B.V.  
1. Introduction
Permit markets are a ﬁrmly established policy tool for pollution control. They are extensively
studied in the academic literature and are frequently applied to actual pollution problems. There
is,  however, a critical gap in the theory and practice of permit market design. When pollution is
non-uniformly mixed and the characteristics of the ﬁrms that generate pollution are uncertain to the
regulator,  then the optimal scale of the market is a fundamental market design issue (Krysiak and
Schweitzer, 2010). In other words, should polluting ﬁrms be clustered into a few large trading zones,
or  is it better to have many smaller zones, each with a few ﬁrms?
Although  this question has received scant attention, two  recent papers have taken steps toward a
theory  of optimal scale.4 Williams (2003) considers the problem of dividing a permit market into the
optimal  number of zones. Firms are allowed to trade within a zone, but not between zones. Williams
identiﬁes a fundamental trade-off between abatement costs and damages from “hot spots”. As the
number of zones increases, abatement costs increase because ﬁrms have fewer trading partners. But
damages  decrease because more zones allow a tighter control on the spatial distribution of pollu-
tion,  which in turn reduces the severity of hot spots. The optimal number of zones strikes a balance
between these competing considerations. Krysiak and Schweitzer (2010) consider a framework sim-
ilar  to Williams, but also allow uncertainty about the location of the polluting ﬁrms and the spatial
distribution of pollution. In both extant papers, it is assumed that the permit markets are competitive.
We  extend the literature on optimal scale for permit markets in several ways. First, we consider
the possibility that ﬁrms may  exert market power. As the number of zones increases, the number of
ﬁrms  in a given zone decreases, and the competitive assumption becomes increasingly less tenable.
In  fact, a permit market with a small number of ﬁrms has an interesting market structure, as both
buyers and sellers may  exert market power. Several authors have analyzed such markets (Malueg
and Yates, 2009; Wirl, 2009; Lange, 2012) and we  incorporate their insights into the study of optimal
scale.5 Once we move away from the competitive model, then other industrial organization issues
such as private information may  arise. In addition to the regulator, ﬁrms themselves may  be uncertain
about the abatement costs of the other ﬁrms, so that a given ﬁrm’s abatement costs may  be private
information to that ﬁrm. Our second extension, then, is to allow for this private information and to
study  its effect on the optimal scale of the market. Of the papers that consider market power in permit
markets, only Malueg and Yates (2009) allow for both market power and private information, so we
utilize  their model in our analysis.
Including market power and private information modiﬁes the trade-offs in determining optimal
scale. For example, Malueg and Yates (2009) show that, relative to competition, the market power
and  private information cases lead to a decrease in the quantity of trading, which in turn leads to an
increase in abatement costs. In this paper we show that there is also a corresponding beneﬁt. Under
the  assumptions of our theoretical model, the reduction in trade leads to a reduction in the severity of
hot  spots. So the net effect of market power and private information is ambiguous. It is possible that
total  costs in the market power and private information cases may  in fact be lower than the total costs
in  the competitive case. Moreover, we argue that the magnitude of the differences between market
structures will be small. In other words, the performance of a permit market will not be signiﬁcantly
diminished due to the presence of market power and private information, provided that the market
is  optimized with respect to scale.
4 Mendelsohn (1986) analyzes the choice between uniform and differentiated regulation, but does not explicitly model the
mixing of pollution.
5 Other models of market power in permits markets consider a dominant ﬁrm, competitive fringe structure. See Hahn (1984)
and Westskog (1996).
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Our ﬁnal extension to the literature is an application of an optimal scale analysis to an actual eco-
logical system. This provides a robustness test to the theory because the application utilizes weaker
assumptions. We  consider emissions of nitrogen from waste water treatment plants (WWTP) into
North  Carolina’s Neuse River System. We  integrate a state-of-the-art hydro-ecological model of the
spatial  distribution of nitrogen through the Neuse, and make a determination of abatement cost func-
tions  for the WWTP. Using the resulting model, we determine the optimal market design for each
market structure. This includes specifying the number of zones as well as the assignment of speciﬁc
plants into these zones. For many combinations of the parameters, the market power and private
information cases do indeed lead to lower total costs than the competitive case. But, consistent with
theory,  the overall differences between market structures are small.
In  addition to being a useful companion to theory, our application has implications for water quality
regulation. The Neuse River is classiﬁed as section 303(d) impaired water under the Clean Water Act.
The  typical regulation of 303(d) impaired waters is fairly restrictive. The EPA issues a permit to each
treatment plant which speciﬁes a maximum emission level from that plant. There is no trading of
permits among the treatment plants. In the speciﬁc case of the Neuse, the state of NC and the EPA, in
conjunction with the waste treatment plants, have crafted a more ﬂexible regulation that does allow
some  trading between a group water treatment plants collectively called the Neuse River Compliance
Association (NRCA). Our analysis of the Neuse takes this positive development as a starting point.
Given that trading is allowed, what is the optimal scale for this trading? The answer to this question
is  our optimal market design for the Neuse. We  show that this design can lead to signiﬁcant decreases
in  total costs relative to the typical section 303(d) regulation.
2.  Model elements
There  are m spatially distributed ﬁrms that generate emissions of pollution. Following Malueg and
Yates  (2009), ﬁrm i’s abatement costs are
Ci(i, ei) =

2
(
i

−  ei
)2
, (1)
where ei are emissions and i is a cost parameter known to ﬁrm i. To the regulator, and, in the case
of  private information, to the other ﬁrms, i is a random variable with expected value i and variance
2
i
. The marginal abatement cost function is (− ∂Ci/∂ei) = i − ei.
Pollution causes damages which are quantiﬁed at n spatially distributed measurement sites. Con-
sider  the vectors x and y, where xj is the pollution at site j due to the activity of the ﬁrms and yj is due
to  other exogenous sources of pollution. Damages are
D(x + y) = 1
2
(x + y)B(x + y)t , (2)
where B is a diagonal matrix with entries bjj. We  interpret bjj as the slope of the marginal damage
function at site j.
The  spatial distribution of pollution is determined by a m × n transfer matrix A that maps emissions
from the sources to the measurement sites. Let e be a vector of emissions. We  have x = eA. Substituting
this into (2) and simplifying gives
D(e) = 1
2
e(ABAt)et + y(BAt)et + 1
2
yByt.
Because this function is deﬁned with respect to emissions, it is commensurate with the abatement
cost functions. We  do not explicitly model uncertainty about damages.6
6 If there is uncertainty about damages that is independent from the i ’s, then the variance of the damage uncertainty will
not inﬂuence the optimal market design (Stavins, 1996). Under these conditions, the magnitude of the damage parameters can
be implicitly interpreted as expected values of random variables.
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Market designs are derived from partitions of the set of ﬁrms {1, 2, 3, . . .,  m}, where each number
identiﬁes a speciﬁc ﬁrm. For example, the partition {1, 3}, {2, 4, 5, . . .,  m} deﬁnes two  trading zones.
Firms 1 and 3 comprise the ﬁrst zone, and these ﬁrms trade with each other, but they do not trade
with the other ﬁrms. At one extreme, corresponding to the trivial partition {1, 2, 3, . . .,  m}, there is a
single zone. All ﬁrms trade with each other and so we call this the full-trading partition. At the other
extreme, corresponding to the partition {1}, {2}, . . .,  {m}, there are m zones, which precludes any
trading, so we call this the no-trade partition. The set of feasible market designs is equal to the set of
all  partitions of {1, 2, 3, . . .,  m}. Its size increases rapidly in m. (For m = 10 there are 115,975 partitions,
while for m = 20 there are 5 × 1013 partitions.)
Due  to their prominent role in the literature, any discussion of permit markets and non-uniformly
mixed pollution would be incomplete without a consideration of trading ratios.7 In a market with
trading ratios, emissions do not trade on a one-for-one basis between ﬁrms. For our purposes, it is
important to observe that even if a market has trading ratios, there still is the question of optimal
scale. For a given set of trading ratios, the performance of the market will be improved by partitioning
it into the optimal number of zones.8 For simplicity, then, in our analysis we  assume that all trades
are on a one-for-one basis.
Consider a zone with  ≥ 2 ﬁrms. We  use Malueg and Yates (2009) model to describe the permit
market equilibrium. Each ﬁrm is given an endowment of permits wi. Firms submit a net-trade function
(that  speciﬁes how many permits the ﬁrms are willing to buy or sell at various prices) to a market
maker.9 The net-trade function vi = (1/)(ai − p) for ﬁrm i is linear in the price of permits p and
contains one parameter ai that is selected by the ﬁrm.10 The market maker selects the equilibrium
price such that overall sum of net trades is equal to zero. It follows that p = (1/)
∑
ai. The equilibrium
price in a zone is equal to the average of the parameters selected by the ﬁrms in that zone. Once
the equilibrium price is speciﬁed, then the net-trade function combined with the permit endowment
determines the emissions of pollution through the equation ei = vi + wi. For example, if the net-trade
function, evaluated at the equilibrium price, is positive, then the ﬁrm buys permits in the market and
thus  they are able to emit more pollution than their endowment.
Each  ﬁrm i selects ai (and hence speciﬁes their net-trade function) to minimize the sum of abate-
ment costs and permit expenditures. The exact formulation of this optimization problem depends on
the  market structure. Malueg and Yates (2009) derive results for three cases: competition, market
power, and private information. Competitive ﬁrms take the market price as given. This case serves
as  a useful baseline, but it is not very realistic when there are a small number of ﬁrms in a zone. In
the  market power and private information cases, both buyers and sellers realize that the value of ai
they select will inﬂuence the market price (through the relation p = (1/)
∑
ai). These cases are distin-
guished by the informational assumptions about the abatement cost parameters. In the market power
case,  it is assumed that a given ﬁrm i knows the values for j for all the other ﬁrms j. In the private
information case, this assumption is relaxed. Here ﬁrm i has the same information as the regulator
about j. So ﬁrm i treats j as a random variable with expected value j and variance 2j .
The details of how the ﬁrms select the values for ai in each of the three cases is discussed in Appendix
A. Under competition, the emissions of pollution for ﬁrm i are
eci =
1

(i − (˜  − w˜)), (3)
7 See Montgomery (1972) for an early example and Tietenberg (2005) for a survey. Hung and Shaw (2005) and Farrow et al.
(2005) consider water pollution permit markets with trading ratios. Trading ratios have also been used for point–nonpoint
trading  (Horan and Shortle, 2005).
8 Determining exactly how much of an improvement will occur is complicated by the fact that there does not appear to be an
general analysis of the optimal trading ratios for a model with nonlinear damages and uncertainty about abatement costs. We
leave such a determination and comparison with optimal scale for further work. The results from this paper, however, justify
the use of the competitive market structure as a basis for such a comparison.
9 Net-trade function equilibria are an extension of the Klemperer and Meyer (1989) supply function equilibria to the case in
which both buyers and sellers exert market power. See Hendricks and McAfee (2010) and Malueg and Yates (2009).
10 Firms select the intercept of the net-trade function, but the slope is ﬁxed at 1/. This restriction yields an unique equilibrium.
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where the tilde denotes the average across ﬁrms in the zone. Under market power we  have
emp
i
=
(
 − 1

)
eci () +
1

wi. (4)
The emissions of pollution are a convex combination of the emissions of pollution under competition
and the emissions of pollution at the permit endowment. For the private information case, let the
average of the expected values of i for the ﬁrms in a zone be denoted by ˜. We  have
epi
i
= emp
i
() + 1

(
1
( + 1)
)
((˜ − ˜)  − (i − i)). (5)
The emissions of pollution are equal to the emissions of pollution in the market power case plus
an  adjustment that depends on the differences between the individual and average expected cost
parameters and their actual realizations.
We use the notation W(ec), W(emp), and W(epi) to denote the expected total costs of an arbitrary
partition for the competitive, market power, and private information cases respectively. For example,
under  competition, we have
W(ec) =
m∑
i=1
E[Ci(i, e
c
i ] + E[D(ec)]. (6)
To determine the optimal scale of the market, one evaluates all possible partitions and then selects
the one with the lowest total expected costs. The optimal partition speciﬁes the optimal number of
zones  and also the optimal assignment of ﬁrms into these zones.
3.  The effect of market power and private information
We  now derive several theoretical results for the effects of market power and private information
on the optimal scale of the market. In this section we assume that all zones in a given partition have
an  equal number of ﬁrms .11
Our ﬁrst main result exploits the relationship between the emissions of pollution under competition
and market power given in (4) to determine an upper bound on the welfare loss due to market power
(all  proofs are given in Appendix A.)
Proposition 1. For any given partition, we have
W(emp) − W(ec) ≤ 1

(W(w) − W(ec)), (7)
where W(w) is the total expected costs of the no-trade partition.
To  understand the implications of (7), we ﬁrst apply it to the full trading partition (so that  = m).
In  this case W(w) − W(ec) is the net beneﬁt of full trading under competition. If it is positive, then (7)
shows that the welfare loss from market power is no greater than a fraction 1/m of the net beneﬁt of
full  trading. If it is negative, then we have an example in which market power leads to lower total costs
than  competition. Next consider an arbitrary partition with  ﬁrms per zone and assume W(w) − W(ec)
is  positive. The upper bound on the welfare loss becomes looser as  decreases. At the extreme case
of   = 2, market power leads to a loss of no more than half of the net beneﬁt of competitive trading.
To obtain further results, we make additional simplifying assumptions that are consistent with
those made in other theoretical studies of optimal scale (Williams, 2003; Krysiak and Schweitzer,
2010). With respect to the abatement cost functions, we  assume that the variance of cost parameter
is the same for all ﬁrms (2
i
= 2 for every i) and that the value of each expected marginal abatement
cost function at the permit endowment is the same for all ﬁrms (i − wi =  for every i). This implies
11 For example, for m = 4, the feasible partitions are: {1, 2, 3, 4} ;{1, 2}, {3, 4} ; {1, 3}, {2, 4} ; {1, 4}{2, 3} ; and {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}.
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that the expected emissions of pollution are equal to the permit endowment for every ﬁrm (and for
every  market structure).
With  respect to damages, we assume that there are no exogenous sources of pollution (y = 0) and
that  the slope of the marginal damage function is the same across sites (bjj = b for every j). Under
these assumptions the damage function becomes (b/2)e(AAt)et. The matrix AAt plays a critical role in
the  analysis of optimal scale. For example, consider the special case in which pollution is uniformly
mixed. In this case, damages only depend on the sum of emissions, not the speciﬁc location in which
the  emissions are generated. So the elements of AAt are all the same.12 When ﬁrms trade permits,
damages do not change. The optimal market design is to have only one zone because this gives the
ﬁrms  the greatest opportunity to reduce abatement costs through trade.
In the general case, the elements of the matrix AAt are not all the same. When two ﬁrms trade
permits, the emissions of pollution are shifted between the ﬁrms, and this may  lead to a hot spot
(a  large concentration of pollution at a speciﬁc measurement site). The regulator can obtain greater
control over the spatial distribution of pollution by increasing the number of zones. In the limit, with
the  number of zones equal to the number of ﬁrms, there is no trade and the problem of hot spots is
minimized. Of course this structure generates high aggregate abatement costs, because ﬁrms have no
opportunity to reduce abatement costs through trade.
A  more formal analysis reveals how the elements of AAt interact with the zone structure to deter-
mine hot spots. Let e denote the emissions corresponding to some partition r. Deﬁne the severity of hot
spots  as the difference between expected damages for that partition and the damages for the no-trade
partition:
E[D(e)] − D(w) = b
2
E[e(AAt)et] − b
2
w(AAt)wt = b
2
m∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
(E[eiek] − wiwk)i,k, (8)
where i,k is the i, k’th element of AAt. Under our assumption on the permit endowment, E[ei] = wi
for every i. Thus (8) contains the variances and covariances of the emissions of pollution. Consider the
competitive case. For the diagonal elements (i = k) we have
Var[eci ] ≡ (E[(eci )
2] − w2i ) =
2
2
(
 − 1

)
, (9)
where the equality comes from substituting in (3) and evaluating the expectation. Allowing ﬁrms to
trade  creates uncertainty about a ﬁrm i’s emissions. This leads to an increase in the severity of hot
spots, the magnitude of which depends on the variance of this uncertainty multiplied by i,i. For the
off-diagonal terms, if i and k are in the same zone we have
Cov[eci , e
c
k] ≡ (E[eci , eck] − wiwk) = −
2
2
.  (10)
Because ﬁrms trade permits, an increase in emissions by one ﬁrm will correspond to a decrease in
emissions by another ﬁrm in the same zone. This latter effect leads to a decrease in the severity of hot
spots,  the magnitude of which depends on the covariance of emissions multiplied by i,k. We  interpret
i,k as the “substitutability” between the emissions of the two  ﬁrms. The greater the value of i,k, the
greater the substitutability, and the greater the decrease in the severity of hot spots. Finally, if i and k
are  in different zones we have
Cov[eci , e
c
k] = (E[eci , eck] − wiwk) = 0. (11)
Firms in different zones do not trade and hence the substitutability of emissions between these ﬁrms
has  no inﬂuence on hot spots.
12 For example, suppose pollution is uniformly mixed and m = n. Then every element of A is equal to one, and every element
of  AAt is equal to m.
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Because i,k only contributes to hot spots if ﬁrms i and k are in the same zone, we deﬁne an indicator
variable Ii,k which takes on the value 1 if i and k are in the same zone and 0 otherwise. Substituting
(9), (10), and (11) into (8) and simplifying gives
E[D(ec)] − D(w) = b
2
22
⎛
⎝( − 1

) m∑
i=1
i,i −
1

∑
i
∑
k /= i
Ii,ki,k
⎞
⎠ .
To simplify further, let i,i be the average of the diagonal elements of AAt, let
i,k =
(∑
i
∑
k /= iIi,ki,k
)
(∑
i
∑
k /= iIi,k
)
be the average of those off-diagonal elements of AAt for which i and k are in the same zone, and let
	(r, ) = i,i − i,k. Using these deﬁnitions we have
E[D(ec)] − D(w) = b
2
22
((
 − 1

)
mi,i −
(
1

)
m( − 1))i,k
)
= mb
2
22
(
 − 1

)
	(r, ).
(12)
The partition-speciﬁc quantity 	(r, ) measures the contribution of the elements of AAt to the severity
of  hot spots. It accounts for the positive contribution of the diagonal elements and the negative contri-
bution  of the appropriate off-diagonal elements. Special cases illustrate its features. At one extreme,
when pollution is uniformly mixed, then the elements of AAt are all the same, 	(r, ) is equal to zero
for  every partition, and there are no hot spots. At the opposite extreme, hot spots are most severe
when pollution is “separable” so that the off-diagonal elements of AAt are equal to zero. If follows that
	(r,  ) is equal i,i for every partition. This occurs, for example, when each ﬁrm only causes damages
at its own location.
We  now present an explicit expression for the expected total costs of any partition under compe-
tition, a result which has been previously derived by Williams (2003). Substituting the expression for
emissions  of pollution (3) in to the abatement cost functions (1) and simplifying gives
m∑
i=1
E[Ci(i, e
c
i )] =
m2
2
+ m
2
2
.
For damages, using (12) gives
E[D(ec)] = b
2
w(AAt)wt + m
2
22
(
b	(r, )( − 1)
)
.
We  see that the expression for expected total abatement costs depends on the number of ﬁrms per
zone,  but not on the assignment of ﬁrms into particular zones. This is a consequence of our assumptions
on abatement costs and the permit endowment. In contrast, expected damages do depend on the
assignment of ﬁrms into particular zones, through the function 	(r, ). Combining these expressions
gives
W(ec) = Q + m
2
22
(
 + b	(r, )( − 1)
)
, (13)
where Q = (m2/2) + (b/2)w(AAt)wt is a constant. We  interpret b	(r, ) as the slope of the “effective”
marginal damage function corresponding to the partition r. The optimal scale of the market ﬁnds the
proper  balance between between abatement costs (through the  term) and hotspots (through the
effective  marginal damage term).
Our second main result is to extend Williams’ analysis to market power and private informa-
tion. Notice that (4) implies that emissions under market power are a linear transformation of
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emissions under competition. Furthermore, under our assumptions about abatement costs and the
permit  endowment, we can write emissions under private information as
epi
i
=
(
2
( − 1)( + 1)
)
emp
i
− 1
( − 1)( + 1)wi. (14)
The emissions under private information are a linear transformation of emissions under market power.
To  obtain the expressions for total expected costs under market power and private information, we
repeat  the analysis above, but use (4) and (14) for emissions instead of (3). The linear transformations
simplify these calculations because we can describe the variance and covariance of emissions of one
market  structure in terms of the variance and covariance of emissions of another market structure.
For details see the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. For the market power case we have
W(emp) = Q + m
2
22
(

(2 +  − 1)
2
+ b	(r, )( − 1) ( − 1)
2
2
)
. (15)
For the private information case we have
W(epi) = Q + m
2
22
(

(2 + 3)
( + 1)2
+ b	(r, )( − 1) ()
2
( + 1)2
)
. (16)
Market power and private information modify the trade-off between abatement costs and hotspots
in  an optimal scale analysis. For a given partition, any market structure may  dominate any other,
depending on the relationship between the slope of the marginal abatement cost function  and the
slope  of the effective marginal damage function b	(r, ).
Insight  into why the comparison across market structures is ambiguous can be gleaned by compar-
ing  the individual components of total expected costs. Malueg and Yates (2009) show that abatement
costs are ordered as∑
E[Ci(e
mp
i
)] >
∑
E[Ci(e
pi
i
)] >
∑
E[Ci(e
c
i )].
Market power leads to greater total expected abatement costs than private information, which in turn
leads  to greater costs than competition. Our next main result shows that damages are ordered as well.
Proposition 3. The expected damages are ordered by
E[D(ec)] > E[D(epi)] > E[D(emp)].
Market power and private information lead to a decrease in the severity of hot spots, and the decrease
is  more pronounced for market power than private information. Combining the two  orderings indi-
cates  that, for example, market power leads to higher abatement costs than competition but lower
damages. The net effect on total expected costs is thus ambiguous. We  also see that market power
and competition are the extreme cases, with private information being more moderate with respect
to  both abatement costs and damages. For this reason, most of our subsequent comparisons will be
between market power and competition.
We now analyze the relationship between the number of ﬁrms per zone  (or equivalently the
number of zones) and the optimal partitions for different market structures. First observe that, for a
given  , the only thing that varies across partitions in (13), (15), and (16) is 	(r, ). So let 	() denote the
smallest  value of 	(r, ) among all partitions with a given value of . The function 	() is independent
of market structure, so that, for a given value of , the same partition leads to the lowest total cost for
all  three market structures. It follows that if the optimal partitions for two market structures have the
same  value for , then they must in fact be the same partition. But the optimal partitions for different
market structures need not have the same value for , because the coefﬁcients on the abatement cost
and  effective marginal damage terms in (13), (15), and (16) are different functions of . So it may  be the
case  that the optimal partitions differ across market structures, and if so, then these optimal partitions
will  have a different values for .
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Our next main result shows that such differences may  indeed occur and gives insight into their
structure. Here it is useful to think about the comparative statics with respect to b. As b increases, hot
spots  generally become more severe, and so we would expect the optimal partition would have a lower
value  of  to give better control over the spatial distribution of pollution. Consider a critical value for
b  such that the total expected costs of having  ﬁrms per zone is just equal to the total expected costs
of  having  − 1 ﬁrms per zone. For competition, denote this value as bc and for market power denote
this value as bmp. The following proposition delineates the relationship between these quantities.
Proposition 4. Suppose that  ≤ 3 and m is divisible by both  and  − 1. Then bmp > bc.
Proposition 4 shows that, for  ≤ 3, as b increases, the optimal partition will switch from  to  − 1
for  competition before it does for market power. In other words, for  ≤ 3, market power will have
an  equal number or fewer zones than competition. For  > 3 the comparison between bmp and bc is
ambiguous, and market power may  have more or less zones than competition.
Our ﬁnal main result is to characterize the solution for optimal scale in the case of separable
pollution. The separable case presents the most severe hot spot problem and thus we  can use it to
characterize an upper bound on the welfare loss of competition relative to market power. This provides
a  complementary result to (7).
Proposition 5. Suppose that pollution is separable and m > 2. We  have
W∗(ec) − W∗(emp)
W(w) ≤
(4m2/27)
Q + (m2/2) ,  (17)
where W∗(ec) and W∗(emp) are the total expected costs of the optimal partitions for competition and market
power, respectively.
We  interpret the expression on the left-hand-side of (17) as the welfare loss due to competition,
normalized relative to the total costs of the no-trade partition. To obtain the upper bound, we take
the  limit of (17) as 2 approaches inﬁnity. This limit implies that the normalized welfare loss from
competition is no more than thirty percent.
Taken as a whole, our theoretical results suggest that the performance of the market will not be
signiﬁcantly effected by the presence of market power or private information. Eq. (7) shows that a
permit  market with market power will obtain at least the majority of the welfare gains from compet-
itive  trading. The exact expressions for total expected costs under all three market structures show
that  no market structure is dominant. Finally, the analysis of the separable case illustrates that even in
the  limits of an extreme case, the normalized welfare loss from competition relative to market power
will  not exceed thirty percent.
4. Application: the Neuse River
Our application focuses on emissions of nitrogen from WWTP  into North Carolina’s Neuse River.
Following the theoretical model, we employ quadratic abatement cost functions and damage functions
so  that we can obtain an analytical solution for market equilibria. The other theoretical assumption we
retain  is that bjj = b for every j. This implies that the damage function is the same at each measurement
site, whether it be a location in the river, at a reservoir, or at the estuary. In contrast to the theory,
we do not restrict zones to have an equal number of ﬁrms, we  do not restrict the variances of cost
uncertainty to be equal across ﬁrms, and we allow for exogenous pollution from other sources.
The ﬁnal difference from the theory concerns the permit endowment. When there is market power
or  private information, the choice of the permit endowment may  inﬂuence the total expected costs of
a  given market design. This suggests that one may  want to optimize over the permit endowment for
every  zone in every market design. We  do not pursue this approach here, rather we  simply consider
two convenient permit endowment rules. In the theoretical section, we  used an endowment rule
that  equated expected marginal abatement costs across ﬁrms. Malueg and Yates (2009) show that
this  endowment rule minimizes the increase in abatement costs resulting from market power and
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private information. In our application, to facilitate comparisons with current regulation, the initial
endowments are set equal to the optimal endowments for the no-trade partition.13
We  focus on the ten largest WWTP  in the NRCA so that an exhaustive search of the feasible set can
be  evaluated in a reasonable time on a personal computer. This enables us to study the robustness of
the  theory without the confounding factors of algorithm convergence and accuracy. The ten WWTP
currently generate about 80 percent of the permitted emissions of nitrogen from the entire set of 22
WWTP  in the NRCA.
The  details of the Neuse River including pollution sources and measurement sites is given in Fig. 1.
The  map  shows the actual geographic location for these elements and the schematic diagram shows
their  spatial relationship in a network system. In the schematic diagram, the lines represent the ﬂow of
water  through the river system. The boxes represent the location of the WWTP  and/or measurement
sites. There are 10 WWTP. For example, the box labelled 1 is the most upstream WWTP  on the main
channel. There are 15 measurement sites. There is a measurement site corresponding to each WWTP.
Measurement site 11 corresponds to Falls Lake reservoir. Measurement sites 12, 13, and 14 correspond
to  the conﬂuence of two channels. Site 15 is the estuary.
The  transfer matrix A is based on a watershed-scale water quality model. In particular, we use
a  ﬁrst-order nitrogen attenuation model based on the Spatially-Referenced Regression on Water-
shed attributes (SPARROW) model maintained by the USGS for southeastern river basins (Hoos and
McMahon, 2009). The SPARROW model is a nonlinear regression which uses spatially-referenced
watershed and stream channel characteristics to predict in-stream nutrient loads.14
To minimize computation we utilize only a portion of the SPARROW model. The matrix A contains
the in-stream nitrogen delivery ratios (from source to measurement site) derived from the SPARROW
model as calibrated for the Neuse River Basin. In SPARROW the in-stream nitrogen load for a stream
reach is calculated as the sum of contributions from the reach immediately upstream and the runoff
from  the reach catchment. Within the stream channel the model assumes a ﬁrst-order attenuation
model for nitrogen as it travels through the network as a result of ecological processes. Thus the load
reaching a down-stream end of a reach is modeled in SPARROW as
Ldownstream = Lupstream × e−kiTi ,
where ki is a nitrogen uptake rate with units of inverse time and Ti represents the average travel time
of  water, both indexed for reach i. The parameters ki and Ti are identiﬁed from hydrologic and water
quality data via the regression. For our purposes, we estimated the stream-wise distances between
point sources and measurement sites using GIS software. We  then use the SPARROW estimate Ti
to calculate an average water velocity between each point source and measurement site. When the
path  from source to site included multiple SPARROW reaches, the average velocity was  computed
based on the average of the Ti weighted by the proportion of the path length spent in each reach.
These average velocities are multiplied by the corresponding weighted average ki to get a ﬁrst-order
decay rate in units of inverse distance. The elements of A are computed as Ai,j = e−ıi,jLi,j where ıi,j is the
nitrogen decay rate per unit distance taken as a weighted average of the decay rates for the SPARROW
reaches traversed, and Li,j is the in-stream distance from source i to measurement site j. If a reservoir is
present  along the stream path, SPARROW introduces a further factor to represent reservoir processing
of  nitrogen given by
1
1 + ZRR
,
where R is the reservoir loss coefﬁcient estimated by SPARROW (R = 10.7) and ZR is the quotient of
the  mean ﬂow into the reservoir and the average reservoir surface area. The complete A matrix is given
in  Table 1.
13 Reallocating the endowment so that expected marginal abatement costs are equal (as in the theoretical section) results in
an 2.8 percent increase in total cost for our policy case set of parameters.
14 Although we do not pursue this approach here, it is conceptually easy to add uncertainty about the spatial distribution of
pollution. In this case, the elements of A are random variables. For the Neuse, one could use another model, called SWAT (see
Gassman et al., 2007), as the outputs of this model are indeed stochastic.
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Fig. 1. Neuse River: WWTP  sources and measurement sites.
So far we have only accounted for the routing and decay of point source nitrogen loads. To model the
exogenous non-point source loading we used the SPARROW predicted loads for each measurement site
and  then, using the matrix A, subtracted the contributions to the predicted loads due to the wastewater
treatment plants.15
15 SPARROW applies a ﬁtted loss coefﬁcient to the emissions of all point sources in the Neuse basin such that only 79 percent
of  point source loads are modeled as reaching the stream channel for transport. To calculate the N background loads we applied
this factor. However, for subsequent calculations of N delivery we assume that 100 percent of WWTP  nitrogen loads reach the
stream channel for transport.
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Table 1
Transfer matrix A.
Source Measurement site
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 1.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.08  0.08
2  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.78 0.00 0.77 0.77 0.00 0.98 0.98 0.77 0.77
3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.95 0.00 0.95 0.76 0.00 0.75 0.75 0.00 0.95 0.95 0.75 0.75
4  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00  1.00 0.80 0.00 0.79 0.79 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.79 0.79
5  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.91 0.72 0.00 0.72 0.72 0.00 0.00  0.91 0.72 0.72
6  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.80 0.00 0.79 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 0.79
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.99
8  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.91
9  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
10  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
To ﬁnish the speciﬁcation of damages, we use the context of the overall model to determine upper
and lower bounds for b. To determine the upper bound, we  utilize the problem of minimizing W(w)
with respect to w. As the magnitude of b increases, damages become increasingly more severe, and
correspondingly, the magnitude of the elements of the optimal w decrease. Because Ci and D are
quadratic, for some large value of b, the magnitude of at least one of the elements of the optimal w will
become  zero. The critical value of b that causes this to happen represents the maximum value for the
damage  parameter such that it is economically efﬁcient to allow all plants to emit positive amounts
of  nitrogen. This represents a useful upper bound on the magnitude of damages. The lower bound is
derived  from the current regulatory environment. The Neuse River Estuary is classiﬁed as a 303(d)
impaired water under the CWA, speciﬁcally as a nutrient sensitive water. In response, the EPA has
constructed a limit on the total load of nitrogen at the estuary. The lower bound for b is constructed
such that the total load of nitrogen at the estuary, as calculated from our model, is equal to the actual
regulatory limit.16 Following these steps, we determined the upper bound on b to be $105,000 per
(mg/L)2 and the lower bound on b to be $30,000 per (mg/L)2.
Turning  to abatement costs, we specify a value for  by utilizing an engineering cost study of the
inputs of energy, materials, and technology for a generic WWTP.17 This approach is based on the idea
that  all WWTP  have access to the same general methods for removing nitrogen, but abatement costs
differ  due to ideosyncratic differences in technical skills, input prices, and management at the various
WWTP. This dovetails nicely with our theoretical model in which the regulator has imperfect infor-
mation about ﬁrms’ abatement costs. Incorporating the ideosyncratic differences as random variables
leads  to a speciﬁcation of the i. A value for 2i is not determined, but rather 
2
i
is treated as a free
parameter in the model. The details of the engineering cost study are in Appendix A.
5. Results
We  now analyze the effects of market power and private information and determine the optimal
market design for the Neuse. There are two sets of free parameters, the variances of the regulator’s
uncertainty about abatement costs 2
i
and the damage parameter b. For the variances, we  scale them
proportionately to the expected values of the random variables, so that we can use a single uncertainty
parameter 
. In particular, we let i = (
/100)(i/2). We  interpret 
 as the “percent error” in the
random variables because is very likely that a realization of the random variable i lies within 

percent of the expected value i.18
16 In particular, for a given b, the problem of minimizing W(w) gives an optimal w. Mapping the ﬂow of emissions from this w
through the river system gives a total load of nitrogen at the estuary. When this matches the actual regulatory limit, we have
the lower bound for b.
17 Alternatively, one might conduct an econometric analysis. Examples of this approach are found in include Sado et al. (2010),
Fraas and Munley (1984), and McConnell and Schwarz (1992). Similar data is not readily available for the Neuse WWTP.
18 For a normal random variable, the probability is 0.95.
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Fig. 2. Optimal design as function of b and 
.
The fundamental trade-off between abatement costs and damages is now captured by the two
parameters b and 
. As 
 increases, the regulator’s uncertainty about abatement costs increases.
The regulator expects more heterogeneity in costs of reducing pollution across the various sources.
So  expanding opportunities for trade will reduce expected total abatement costs. Consequently, the
optimal  market design converges toward the full-trade partition. Conversely, as b increases, the sever-
ity  of damages increases. This increases the regulator’s concerns about hot spots, so the regulator
seeks greater spatial control over the emissions of pollution. Consequently, the optimal market design
converges toward the no-trade partition.
5.1. Optimal designs and cost savings for various model parameters
An  overview of the variation in optimal designs over the full range of the parameters 
 and b is
given in Fig. 2. At the bottom of Fig. 2 is the region for which the optimal design is the no-trade
partition and hence there are 10 zones. Notice that the boundary for this region occurs at very small
levels  for 
. As soon as there is essentially any uncertainty about abatement costs, the optimal design
allows for at least some limited trading. In particular, WWTP  9 and 10 are the ﬁrst to be allowed to
trade.  Emissions from these WWTP  are close substitutes in that they have very similar transfer rates
to  the estuary. So trade between them will not cause much of a hot spot problem and will generate
abatement cost savings for any non-zero 
. At the top of Fig. 2 is the region for which the optimal design
is  the full-trading partition and hence there is a single zone. The boundary for this region occurs at
very  large levels for 
. There must be considerable uncertainty before the optimal design allows full
trading.  In particular, WWTP  1 is the last to join the other ﬁrms. For most values of 
 it is not optimal
to allow WWTP  1 to trade with downstream ﬁrms, because the net result may  be a large increase in
pollution at an upstream location and this pollution is then routed downstream through large portion
of  the river system. Only when 
 becomes quite large are the concerns about hot spots from trade by
WWTP  1 outweighed by concerns about abatement costs and so a single zone becomes optimal. In
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Fig. 3. Distribution of total expected costs (millions of dollars per year): competition, b = 30,000, 
 = 10.
what follows, we use more moderate values for 
. In particular, we  use 10 percent error as our base
case  uncertainty and use 5 and 20 percent errors for sensitivity tests.
Fig.  3 shows the distribution of expected total costs over all 115,975 possible market designs for
one  particular parameter combination (
 = 10, b = 30,000) and competitive market conditions. The
difference between expected total expected costs of the optimal design and the worst design is approx-
imately  2.1 million dollars per year. An interesting feature of this distribution is the clump of outcomes
isolated on the right-hand side. Most of the market designs in this clump correspond to cases in which
WWTP  number 4 is in its own zone. This particular plant has the largest outﬂow, and correspondingly
the largest abatement costs. A market design in which this plant is not allowed to trade generally per-
forms  poorly because the plant is forced to reduce its emissions by incurring large abatement costs.
Also  of importance is the fact that the left tail of the distribution is quite thin. Only a few market
designs perform very well. The optimal market design in Fig. 3 is described by the partition {1}, {2, 3,
4,  5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. This is the optimal market design for both the market power and private information
cases as well. The corresponding histograms have a similar shape, although the range is not quite as
large  as for competition.
To  obtain a more comprehensive study of the differences in optimal design across market struc-
tures, we vary the damage parameter from its lower to upper bound while keeping 
 ﬁxed at 10. The
corresponding optimal market designs are described in Table 2. For a given set of parameters, the
optimal market design may  depend on structure of competition. For example, when b = 55,000, the
optimal  design under competition is {1}, {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8}, {7, 9, 10}, but the optimal market design
under market power and private information is {1}, {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}.
In addition to the optimal design, it is also of interest to specify the cost savings associated with
allowing trading. Fig. 4 shows the difference between the expected total costs under the optimal
market design and the expected total costs under the no-trade partition for the same set of parameters
as in Table 2. Each of the lines corresponds to a speciﬁc market structure. The average cost savings
over all values of the parameters and market structures is about 1.6 million dollars per year. The lines
Table 2
Optimal market designs for various ranges of b with 
 = 10.
Optimal partition Range of b
Competition Market power Private information
{1}, {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10} 30,000–50,000 30,000–65,000 30,000–60,000
{1}, {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8}, {7, 9, 10} 55,000–105,000 70,000–105,000 65,000–105,000
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Fig. 4. Expected cost savings relative to no trade (millions of dollars per year): 
 = 10.
are sloped downward and would all eventually converge to zero. (As the damage parameter becomes
large,  the optimal designs converge to the no-trade partition for all market structures.)
Next we analyze sensitivity of our results with respect to 
. Fig. 5 shows the cost savings for 
 = 5.
Here the regulator’s uncertainty about abatement costs are lower than for 
 = 10, and correspondingly
the magnitude of total cost savings is smaller, averaging around 375 thousand dollars per year. The
optimal designs are given in Table 3. The optimal designs generally have more zones than for 
 = 10.
Fig.  6 shows the cost savings for 
 = 20. Here the regulator’s uncertainty about abatement costs are
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Fig. 5. Expected cost savings relative to no trade: 
 = 5.
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Table 3
Optimal market designs for various values of b with 
 = 5.
Optimal partition Range for b
Competition Market power Private information
{1}, {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8}, {7, 9, 10} 30,000–50,000 30,000–70,000 30,000–65,000
{1}, {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {7, 8, 9, 10} 55,000 75,000–85,000 70,000–85000
{1}, {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {7, 9, 10}, {8} 60,000–105,000 90,000–105,000 90,000–105,000
higher than for 
 = 10, and correspondingly the magnitude of total cost savings is larger, averaging
around 6.8 million dollars per year. There is no variation in the optimal design. For all values of b, the
optimal design is {1}, {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}.
5.2. Relation between theory and application
According to theory, the effect of market structure on total expected costs is ambiguous. The results
for  the Neuse show that this ambiguity is not just a theoretical curiosity but may arise in an actual
market. Because the expected costs under the no-trade partition are the same for all three market
structures, the relative cost savings across market structures can be seen by direct comparison of the
lines  in Fig. 4 and 6. For a variety of values for the parameters shown in these ﬁgures, the private
information and market power lines lie above the competition line, implying they lead to greater cost
savings  than competition.
Theory  also suggests that the overall performance of the market will not be sensitive to market
power and private information. The results from the Neuse show that this conclusion continues to hold
when  we relax many of the theoretical assumptions. Although there is variation in the cost savings
according to the type of market structure, the magnitude of this variation is small relative to the overall
cost  savings. For example, the biggest difference between the lines in Fig. 4 is about 40,000 dollars per
year,  implying a welfare loss of only a few percent.
Finally, the theoretical results suggest that market power will have an equal number or fewer
zones than competition, provided that zones have the same number of ﬁrms and this number of ﬁrms
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is small. In our application, the zones may  have different numbers of ﬁrms, but nevertheless, we ﬁnd
that  market power has a equal number or fewer zones than competition. As shown in Tables 2 and 3,
each  critical value for b that is on the boundary of an increase in the optimal number of zones is lower
for  competition than it is for market power (so that competition switches to more zones before market
power).
5.3.  Policy implications
The  next phase in nitrogen regulation in the Neuse is likely to involve a large decrease in emissions
relative to current limits. We  simulate this by selecting the upper bound on the damage parameter
b = 105,000. This corresponds to an approximately 25 percent decrease in nitrogen as measured at the
estuary.  Using a base case value of 
 = 10 and the private information market structure, the optimal
design can be found from Table 2. There are three zones. WWTP  7, 9, and 10 are in the ﬁrst zone, WWTP
1  is in the second zone, and the rest are in the third zone. This optimal design leads to approximately
1.55 millions dollars per year of cost savings relative to the no-trade partition. Decomposing these cost
savings  into changes in abatement costs and damages shows a 1.68 million dollars per year decrease in
abatement  costs and a 0.13 million dollars per year increase in damages. Thus a rather large decrease
in  abatement costs can be generated by allowing a modest increase in damages from the no-trade
partition.19
6. Conclusion
Our results show that in both theory and application, the performance of a permit market that is
optimized with respect to scale is not very sensitive to the exact structure of the competition within
it.  This is an important observation for policy as well as for future research. A regulator might be wary
of  setting up a market along the lines of our optimal design for the Neuse, because there are only three
ﬁrms  in one of the zones and so ﬁrms in this zone are likely to exert market power. Although it is true
that  market power leads to an increase in abatement costs, there is a corresponding beneﬁt from the
reductions in damages from hot spots. The net effects of market power tend to cancel out, so that the
overall  costs are similar to those obtained under competitive conditions. This implies that as long as
the  markets are optimized with respect to scale, then a regulator need not be overly concerned about
the  possibility that ﬁrms may  exert market power. Likewise, for future research on permit markets
with trading zones, our results justify exploiting the analytical simplicity of competitive conditions,
regardless of the number of ﬁrms in these zones.
Our analysis of North Carolina’s Neuse River offers an economic assessment of 303(d) regulation.
Under the most likely regulatory scenario, we  ﬁnd cost savings of 1.55 million dollars per year under
the  optimal market design relative to the typical 303(d) regulation in which the WWTP  are not allowed
to  trade. The markets we analyze are relatively simple to implement in that ﬁrms need only trade in a
single  market and permits trade on a one-for-one basis in that market. For these reasons, the markets
studied in this paper may  have great appeal to regulators and policymakers. It is our hope that trading
of  the type described in this paper might ﬁnd increasing application in the Neuse as well as other
watersheds.
The traditional distinction between command-and-control and incentive-based regulation breaks
down  in an analysis of optimal scale. In fact, the optimal design for the Neuse River has elements
of both types of regulation. Because WWTP  1 is in its own zone, the regulator is essentially exerting
command-and-control over WWTP  1. The regulator gives an endowment of permits to this WWTP
but  it is not allowed to adjust its emissions level through trade. The other WWTP’s are subject to
incentive-based regulation. They are given an endowment of permits and are allowed to adjust their
emission levels through trade with other ﬁrms in their zones.
In  our application, we conducted an exhaustive search of the feasible set of market designs. To
analyze a market with more than about 10 ﬁrms, one must consider alternative approaches. An
19 The cost savings of the optimal market design relative to the full-trading partition is 2.73 million dollars per year.
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algorithm such as the nested partition algorithm (Shi and Ólafsson, 2000) could be employed to search
over  the entire feasible space in an efﬁcient manner. Alternatively, one can reduce the feasible set by
only  considering partitions that follow natural geographic or bureaucratic groupings of ﬁrms. Either
of  these approaches should allow one to “scale” the methodology described in this paper. For example,
SPARROW deﬁnes the ﬂow of nitrogen through watersheds in the entire southeastern US. One could
combine several of the watersheds together and analyze the optimal market design on a regional basis.
Appendix A.
A.1.  Engineering cost analysis
The  primary variables in an engineering analysis are the size of the outﬂow of the plant f (in millions
of  gallons per day) and concentration of pollution emitted from the plant c (in mg/l). Emissions are
given  by e = ˛cf, where  ˛ = 8.3431 is the appropriate unit conversion so that e is in units of pounds per
day.  We  assume a generic business-as-usual concentration , and then base the engineering calcula-
tions  on reducing pollution below this level. The business-as-usual emissions corresponding to  are
˛f.  Consistent with the abatement cost function speciﬁcation (1), we  an abatement cost function for
a  generic WWTP  with outﬂow f and concentration c as
C = 
2
(
˛f − ˛cf
)2
. (18)
Now suppose we have engineering data which contains several different concentrations, several differ-
ent  outﬂows for each concentration, and cost data for each combination of concentration and outﬂow.
Using  a simple regression (without a constant) based on (18) gives us an estimate of .20
The appropriate data comes from the Nutrient Reduction Technology Cost Task Force (2002). Using
Table  4c, we have one value for c (3 mg/L) and four values for f (.1MGD, 1MGD, 10 MGD, 30 MGD).
The tables report both capital costs (CP) as well as annual operations (OM) costs in year 2000 dollars.
Following Tsagarakis et al. (2003) we convert these into total annual costs according to the formula
C  = OM + CP × CRF where CRF = ((r(1 + r)t)/((1 + r)t − 1)) is the capital recovery factor. (Here t is the eco-
nomic life, assumed to be 20 years, and r is the cost of capital, assumed to be six percent.) Based on
the  current regulatory requirements for the WWTP’s in the Neuse, we  select a value for  of 3.7 mg/L.
With  these inputs, the simple regression yields an estimated value for  of 243.
To determine a value for i, we assume that the ideosyncratic differences in WWTP  i effect the
actual business-as-usual level of pollution at that plant. In particular, for a plant with outﬂow fi, let
(i/) = ˛fi + εi, where εi is a random variable with expected value zero and variance ˆ2i . It follows
that the expected value of i is ˛fi (and the variance is 2ˆ2).
A.2. Determination of ai in the three market structures
Competitive ﬁrms take the market price p as given. Firm i selects ai to minimize the sum of abate-
ment costs and permit expenditures: min
ai
Ci(vi + wi) + pvi. The solution to this problem is aci = i − wi.
It  follows that, in equilibrium, the emissions of pollution for ﬁrm i are described by (3). In the market
power case, ﬁrms realize their choice of ai will inﬂuence the market price. Firm i selects ai to mini-
mize the sum of abatement costs and permit expenditures: min
ai
Ci(vi + wi) + a˜vi. Assuming an interior
solution, Malueg and Yates (2009) show that the Nash equilibrium value for ai is given by
amp
i
= aci +
1

[(˜  − w˜) − (i − wi)].
20 The error in this regression is interpreted as the error in the engineering study, and is not the same thing as 2
i
, which is
ﬁrm  speciﬁc error. Error in the engineering study is not explicitly utilized.
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It follows that the equilibrium emissions of pollution are described by (4). For the private information
case, ﬁrm i selects ai to minimize the expected sum of abatement costs and permit expenditures:
min
ai
E[Ci(vi + wi) + a˜vi | i.] Malueg and Yates (2009) show that the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium value
for ai is given by
api
i
= ac + 1

[(˜ − w˜) − (i − wi)] +
1
 + 1 (i − i).
It follows that the equilibrium emissions of pollution are described by (5).
A.2.1. Proofs of propositions
Proof  of Proposition 1. Since W is convex we  have
W(emp) = W
(
 − 1

ec + 1

w
)
≤  − 1

W(ec) + 1

W(w).
Subtracting W(ec) from both sides and simplifying yields (7).
Before  proving Proposition 2, we state a Lemma.
Lemma  1. Consider random variables xi with E[xi] = i and Var[xi] = 2i . Let yi = axi + bi where a + b = 1.
Then E[y2
i
] = a22
i
+ 2
i
and E[yiyk] = a2Cov[xi, xk] + ik.
Proof of Proposition 2. The total expected abatement costs under market power and private infor-
mation follow from a simple modiﬁcation to Propositions 4 and 5 in Malueg and Yates (2009) to
account for the fact that there are  ﬁrms per zone.
For damages, ﬁrst consider market power. Applying Lemma  1 to emp
i
and ec
i
and using (9)–(11)
yields
E[(emp
i
)2] = ( − 1)
2
2
Var(eci ) + w2i =
( − 1)2
2
(
2
2
( − 1)

)
+ w2i ,
E[emp
i
emp
k
] = ( − 1)
2
2
Cov[eci , e
c
k] + wiwk =
( − 1)2
2
(
− 
2
2
)
+ wiwk,
for i and k in the same zones, and E[emp
i
emp
k
] = wiwk for i and k in different zones.
Similarly, applying Lemma  1 to epi and emp gives
E[(epi
i
)2] =
(
2
( − 1)( + 1)
)2
( − 1)2
2
(
2
2
( − 1)

)
+ w2i =
2
( + 1)2
(
2
2
( − 1)

)
+ w2i ,
E[epi
i
epi
k
] =
(
2
( − 1)( + 1)
)2
( − 1)2
2
(
− 
2
2
)
+ wiwk =
2
( + 1)2
(
− 
2
2
)
+ wiwk,
for i and j in the same zone, and E[epi
i
epi
k
] = E[emp
i
emp
k
] and for i and j in different zones. Following the
same steps as in the competitive case yields the expressions in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3. The ordering on damages can be determined by examining the coefﬁcients
of the b	(r, )( −1) term in equations (13), (15), and (16). We  have
1 >
2
( + 1)2
>
( − 1)2
2
.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using (13) and (15), it follows that bmp > bc provided that
(−24 + 123 − 202 + 10 − 2)	() + (45 − 174 + 223 − 92 + 2)(	() − 	( − 1)) (19)
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is positive. The ﬁrst polynomial in (19) is positive for  ≤ 3 and negative otherwise. The second poly-
nomial is non-negative for all  and the term it multiplies is non-negative, as 	() is non-decreasing
in  (Williams, 2003). So for  ≤ 3, we have (19) is positive.
Proof of Proposition 5. Without loss of generality, assume that 	 = 1 for each partition. First consider
competition. We  want to select  to minimize (13). Let W∗(ec) be the corresponding optimal value for
total  expected costs. For b ≤ , the full-trading partition is optimal ( = m), and for b ≥  the no-trading
partition is optimal ( = 1). It follows that
W∗(ec) =
⎧⎨
⎩
Q + 
2m
2
for  b ≥ 
Q + 
2
22
( + b(m − 1)) for b ≤ 
⎫⎬
⎭ .
Now consider market power, and assume for the moment that  is a continuous variable. We  want
to  select  to minimize (15). Let W˜∗(emp) be the corresponding optimal value for total expected costs
and let bˆ = (((m + 3))/(3(m − 1))). Notice that, under the assumption that m > 2 we have bˆ  ≤ . Now
consider the optimal choice of . For b ≤ bˆ, the full trading partition is optimal ( = m). For b ≥ bˆ, the
value  = ((3(b + ))/(3b − )) is optimal. It follows that
W˜∗(emp) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
Q + 
2m(27b2 + 54b − 52)
54(b + )2
for b ≥ bˆ
Q + 
2
22
(
(m2 + m − 1) + b(m − 1)3
m2
)
for b ≤ bˆ
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ .
We  seek to determine the value for b such that competition performs the worst with respect to
market power (i.e. W∗(ec) − W˜∗(emp) is at a maximum). First consider the region b ≥ . At b = , we have
W˜∗(emp) < W∗(ec). Also in this region, W˜∗(emp) is increasing with respect to b but W˜∗(ec) is constant.
It follows that W˜∗(emp) approaches W∗(ec) from below as b increases and hence competition performs
the worst in this region at b = .
There  are three remaining regions to check. The ﬁrst region is b ≤ (()/(2m − 1)). In this region
W˜∗(emp) ≥ W∗(ec). Here competition performs better than market power, which rules out this region
for having the worst performance for competition. The second region is (()/(2m − 1)) ≤ b ≤ bˆ. Here
W∗(ec) − W˜∗(emp) is positive and increasing in b. Hence competition performs the worst in this region
at b = bˆ. At this point we have W∗(ec) − W˜∗(emp) = ((2(m + 1))/(3m)). The ﬁnal region is bˆ ≤ b ≤ .
Here once again W∗(ec) − W˜∗(emp) is positive and increasing in b. Hence competition performs the
worst in this region at b = . At this point we have W∗(ec) − W˜∗(emp) = ((24m)/(27)).
Comparing the results across all regions, it follows that competition performs the worst when b = .
Thus  for any value of b we have W∗(ec) − W˜∗(emp) ≤ ((24m)/(27)). Now  is not actually a continuous
variable, it must be an integer and a divisor of m as well. So let W∗(emp) be the optimal value of expected
total costs when  satisﬁes these constraints. Expected total costs at the optimal constrained value for
  may  be higher than expected total costs for the optimal continuous value for : W∗(emp) ≥ W˜∗(emp).
So we have
W∗(ec) − 
24m
27
≤ W˜∗(emp) ≤ W∗(emp)
Re-arranging and dividing by W(w) gives (17).
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